Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5610e552b9a56a2b…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

328.4 KB
MD5: 356de21f3911e2878ee196dcd3751036 SHA-1: 23095d8bf5ecfc5974e079c642d571ba118d9ece SHA-256: 5610e552b9a56a2b9be262db3c518975066bce0a0f2190b4b9df898a762a3329
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1203

The presence of \objupdate and \objautlink control words in an RTF document is a strong indicator of an Equation Editor exploit. The document also contains a lure to trick the user into enabling content,- a common delivery mechanism for initial access. No scripts were extracted from the sample, but the same structural patterns ares a high-confidence call for an exploit-based dropper.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000bac.bin
88f80aae919c66ecb86668cce13e3863a5aa6245ffb73048bcbd71ed47900f64
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBAC 56437 bytes
objdata_01_off0000735b.bin
96c40213d24ea0b53b74473b11f6b1004f07e64c011a329eba4a5bf44f68d918
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x735B 56410 bytes
objdata_02_off00023e50.bin
a8e170497da15decc11753d202c99c86f7a7ffd2d52481e6b9c79a5403675379
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x23E50 2632 bytes
objdata_03_off000253f3.bin
e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x253F3 12297 bytes