Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 560c3645b414caca…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.5 KB Created: 2020-07-29 02:00:20 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-05-09
MD5: 99b04a3b9eb8ac731a4910b67f3258e4 SHA-1: 6823af6711ff470c7e090335c95fff8bf04e1a1e SHA-256: 560c3645b414cacaf06575d29322c81ce05b048ba45a1b1be31274984c0ffd4e
222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and multiple links, with one critical heuristic identifying a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains text that appears to be a lure for a movie title. The presence of a PDF link farm and ML classification further support malicious intent. The primary attack vector appears to be directing users to malicious sites via embedded links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 7

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Malformed active-content stream length medium PDF_MALFORMED_EXPLOIT_STREAM_LENGTH
    A PDF stream that carries active/exploit-looking content has a declared /Length that does not match the recovered stream body. Malformed stream boundaries and length mismatches are common parser-evasion/supporting evidence around Reader exploit streams.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=adanga+maru+full+movie++in+tamilyogi In PDF document text
    • http://files.stefandolidis.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131408502/jatogaxolutokaxina.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.voutwelding.ca/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637056/xuwex_telubizuduvoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.tombacher.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813639/takop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://topxbestlist.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/8749/5322/files/67657078959.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/3419/8684/files/jojodudokukebereno.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/5757/8138/files/dovupuzuvi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/5259/6374/files/vitifunalodoratabawe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/bijuwosozawubuvenokuzi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/4077/5064/files/54231892263.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/8180/1629/files/25058158471.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/0225/7823/files/45218948855.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/2390/8520/files/mozunepozavugizoritasasop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000681d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x681D 5084 bytes
SHA-256: 3ebb97620f2d0b6e41a99003ce60e335eb3f0cf87aa48309aac298de5c6c234b
font_01_sfnt_off0000795a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x795A 13272 bytes
SHA-256: 2ff2a363ffa6e2e9577464c326d0514ec74beb718a72b750cce7c1eed3bd03ac