Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 560c05a3b8c2d5b6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

63.4 KB
MD5: 0a48291071104b86983d38027ab8fd3b SHA-1: 1ac37472142658f3fc913c6eb3be8ab245ea1f2c SHA-256: 560c05a3b8c2d5b61cbd7d2f1b7a959cc74129fc7fc9642da18d6a79757fae5d
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains an embedded XFA form that exploits CVE-2010-0188 in Adobe Reader. This exploit is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. The ClamAV detection 'Pdf.Exploit.Dropped-93' further confirms its malicious nature. No scripts were extracted, but the exploit itself is the primary attack vector.

Heuristics 7

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Dropped-93 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Dropped-93
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
3bd787f083edb38eacdbc71538d82679e2479a194b2247058fe8b9d931dc6f64
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 64162 bytes