RTF malware analysis — malicious · 5603f5b634043cc2

MALICIOUS

RTF

50.2 KB First seen: 2023-08-02

MD5: 4988698644f51b49860d75366bd0da92 SHA-1: f8994d2bab29fdf58e9204f72da7033a8a8e2408 SHA-256: 5603f5b634043cc267f1a0e39828de7e7701af2fd614f757003471ebf7bc10ba

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically identified as an Equation Editor exploit. The presence of \objupdate and SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristics indicates the document is designed to trick the user into enabling editing, which then activates the embedded object. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting vulnerabilities like the Equation Editor flaw to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00004150.bin` `9fb8034093bd36c61013fa0b43e36f98864406fcdd66a284ca7a5d82b6d55d1f`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x4150	1544 bytes

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