Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 55f90cc4f4af687f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

88.2 KB Created: 2010-08-03 10:00:10 Authoring application: libgnomeprint Ver: 2.18.5 First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: a4da01e5b1dfde948ed6ba07e4f1b4a4 SHA-1: bf5d9d0f181f9303af4e8cea16ed0c28fc83ef6f SHA-256: 55f90cc4f4af687fd4afe8619b320c6b1bc704fcfe549d38fd9e5668d0303d33
576 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious File Execution T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: User Execution T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1566 Phishing T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and a Windows executable payload disguised as a PDF. The critical heuristic CVE_2010_1240 indicates a launch action targeting cmd.exe, which is designed to execute the embedded payload. The embedded executable was detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0, and the PDF itself was detected as Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586. The attack pattern involves luring the user to open a malicious PDF that, when opened, executes a secondary payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\zapytanie.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.zeustech.net/ Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (zapytanie.pdf)
    • tcp://94.75.73.212:443In extracted file (zapytanie.pdf)
    • http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
zapytanie.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 26 at offset 0xB02E 73802 bytes
SHA-256: f014b3aeca34b4ce2b609c8862fd6f8c0622c40de03a9ad180cdf8ed1cd19abe
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=zapytanie.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 94.75.73.212:443 (reverse/x86, public) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
javascript_obj0027_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 27 at offset 0x15CD0 58 bytes
SHA-256: 261f55b262c14beb62c13a5c38d0a479cad84b4658261837f35580baca591471
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "zapytanie", nLaunch: 0 });
font_00_sfnt_off00000f61.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF61 10752 bytes
SHA-256: 8699332905a299f37148eb2497e28179d6c99cc05900c182ee46296cbcdfd88b
font_01_sfnt_off00003d41.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x3D41 24804 bytes
SHA-256: 73f30e29ccda72134f5a16fa9b3832648b957d5ea17da371d1e38d09a1c0d477

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