Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 55ea85824552dc6d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

342.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-04-28
MD5: eca0f33031385f4c49c6601b45ac1e98 SHA-1: 10bb26ec0d7b6c8df8d772cb1d4d353d38a0a931 SHA-256: 55ea85824552dc6d3938be310b5a406c9c06514ffd73f89fe2c6256ffadb9272
148 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an Excel file containing an embedded Equation Editor OLE object. Static analysis identified a critical heuristic firing for CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE, indicating exploitation of this known vulnerability. The VBA macros themselves contain no executable statements, but the presence of the vulnerable OLE object strongly suggests the file is designed to exploit CVE-2017-11882 for initial execution.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EBX) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP EBX)
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
31a999e56b0c068885b029f5b1866d40ea82641e25f69d178bcfa5cbafcc0523
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0233D7F0/oLE10NaTIVE 1581 bytes