Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 55cfc634052487b8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

81.8 KB Created: 2021-09-13 07:32:54 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-14
MD5: e40231c217a5e26d6ce8aadee722141d SHA-1: 285c459664db6a851b58970fa05d5ab21baa7da0 SHA-256: 55cfc634052487b8645ff8ff62391cfef6279fe9e7e2897e87d62ce5708ec712
112 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript, indicating an attempt to execute code. It also features numerous external links, with several pointing to compromised or disposable hosting, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious content. The presence of a download button lure further supports the malicious intent of tricking users into downloading a payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9974

Heuristics 7

  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://nationalcoopadvisors.com/userfiles/files/nowitovotajenelenawozex.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://korzayithalat.com/spot/admin/fckeditor/userfiles/file/87863963474.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mahae.hu/files/files/gijazadu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://protectname.xyz/whoisprivacy/userfiles/files/vavapobupenilanoxuvolak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://abwingstop.com/uploads/files/78960715074.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://drvision.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613bdda099dad---90931787918.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://asia-test.informacittadino.net/media/files/2716981655.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ewdel.cz/ckfinder/userfiles/files/81508970593.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ux02.wadhost.com/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/nasepuzalerelusirimi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.trackls.com/application/ckeditor/ckfinder/userfiles/files/xagupewox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://halobysciton.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613ec5f6d60c4---pedeso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tiga.co.th/ckfinder/userfiles/files/sejilar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pk.mo/userfiles/file/65873745492.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://noavarservice.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/47717637454.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://studioschicchi.eu/userfiles/files/13981245873.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://originalcheck.it/public/img_admin/file///riwupimidori.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://richmore.kr/uploadfile/fckeditor/file/vivebuwamuxavegevar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jaunimodienos.lt/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ret8im66it9udfn071ng5da5a8/wufawafazipoxumifo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn--zb0bw3kv4s8mn.com/upload/fckeditor/file/joradid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://camberwelltaxi.com/survey/userfiles/files/34345957127.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://noticky.net/akce/fotky/file/11438483585.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn--9d0b102a6wc3y4a.com/sa_upload/userfiles/file/20210906084434.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kodemari.info/data/files/noguwaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.liftechforklifts.com.au/application/third_party/ckfinder/userfiles/files/wifoxofesinufubugowijiz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/BvfzZFkJO3s/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+update+x96+miniPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d9c8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD9C8 17964 bytes
SHA-256: 6a4d9d576e77062d5e74f4315dc3029822751e5beb203b261d06628aaba16703
font_01_sfnt_off00010881.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10881 10852 bytes
SHA-256: 8bd86b2e13877ee6848568484ea949ebd2b9311cb3edf9add5739bd54c0e48b8
font_02_sfnt_off0001217b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1217B 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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