Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 55be567219d6db18…

MALICIOUS

PDF

139.6 KB Created: 2020-10-03 12:13:42 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-26
MD5: 72a868378296d27f0c665f370dae5653 SHA-1: 701b076fbea5380fcb378e12fa676b8a40748fb3 SHA-256: 55be567219d6db18f1a5a95403ebfb5f9d1e40a58ef5b62bfaabb72d58873cb8
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a link to a known malicious redirector, disguised as a setup tool. It also hosts a large number of links to other PDFs, many on disposable hosting, suggesting a link farm for SEO manipulation or malware distribution. The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/strik?keyword=miracle+thunder+frp+tool+latest+setup In PDF document text
    • http://files.kamiza.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740277/xawab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vujip.jennifercosta.net/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164250/d061245e8723ea1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tavesomet.taxaffinity.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637316/togalijuke.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037268.mozfiles.com/files/1037268/52071009591.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037005.mozfiles.com/files/1037005/batewejamisat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036861.mozfiles.com/files/1036861/zanadaxubitogefadesof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038762.mozfiles.com/files/1038762/rotewexalotajofutizotuxu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1040045.mozfiles.com/files/1040045/78244837669.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/7206/9525/files/matomewemafuruxotixem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/7578/7157/files/lefivexuwujikusakis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/1396/2908/files/lefexiviwofaxug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/23adeafc-28ef-47c2-8730-73328f56af00/dimuzuwixawopudavubuge.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3a9c6ce6-e638-4ede-87a6-11eaf535486b/sulegidotovinawufa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/61aa09b7-4c22-48ad-8755-f7a15b1e1923/64835857532.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/783a9a4b-09fe-47a7-a4cd-cfd078124a26/jepoduzux.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b81bc4d4-3e8d-400e-9006-e7c059ac663b/87404615043.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001da80.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1DA80 5248 bytes
SHA-256: cde85d0cfe7c0cc7118ecb8e5c203430422b9686c23920bc1774ab919e29af14
font_01_sfnt_off0001ec5a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1EC5A 17008 bytes
SHA-256: 26a63c01dc88ece6770ddb1e65be4e0dc118686b256ebcc168f5eb38f9b45487

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