Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 55bd4c11cbcbba5a…

MALICIOUS

RTF

52.4 KB First seen: 2023-08-04
MD5: 7d132a7e0881ce43b5f5e89d9710d3a2 SHA-1: 987fdb1e27f00656d3de99e247e35b0ad02939bd SHA-256: 55bd4c11cbcbba5abc815bca5cac0afae9669a8986a1c1130666f673b4e171c3
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains OLE object data and specifically targets the Equation Editor, a known vulnerability vector. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document prompts the user to enable editing, a common social engineering tactic to bypass security measures. The embedded OLE object likely contains a malicious payload, possibly an exploit targeting the Equation Editor.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00003f79.bin
8be4cc0e94380da03b4ba8e04ff8c32712247fd7ef528aca99c43fe11a480e7e
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3F79 1602 bytes