Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 55a26c4652e70738…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.64 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-08-05
MD5: 02f4401d2bb94f28f285b40a85a97926 SHA-1: a32009ab8c4d4c0e94e689f7fe6b26e58777a030 SHA-256: 55a26c4652e707388b874cab9b4ceade45db2eb5abbd3f322fa6ebc974ca91ff
272 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The file contains an embedded Equation Editor object known to exploit CVE-2017-11882. This object is used to deliver a secondary PDF payload which, in turn, contains a direct link to a suspicious URL. The VBA macros are present but do not contain executable statements, indicating they are likely boilerplate.

Heuristics 8

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 9

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
5c7a90c7ad0097e073481207e30ba34232754a8e862250f45e292175a82306bc		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0034A353/OLe10NaTivE 1762 bytes
stream_003_off00005d60.bin
2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x5D60 252488 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00092d7d.bin
68d167e68895a344f3603a4efd0d8438eb8fdebe759cee48f2b4adf75c76c961		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x92D7D 12100 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off00094b95.bin
50551000b9f90b3f445ee94749557d9ddf96697a74984b3ccf3d2bae66910750		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x94B95 15820 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001200.pdf
2277b91aec5d3440426c6b4645302e48dd09551a26fdd93f863b4d6fd0e3ee4d		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1200 1715200 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006600.pdf
292126f81863504830348c0d4dc85d06d5a5dc8408175c5de58b73e9b2ec62ef		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6600 1693696 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00029400.pdf
5ddfd9b1e7446e5cda4369455871ec1f0ec9eb712b9d990fbb59703b1f6a0d5b		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x29400 1550848 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0003ec00.pdf
18df39ec9562ba455108820c6908e7992caf86d467dbdc1d340533e8aa5be8f9		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x3EC00 1462784 bytes

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