Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 555d36fdc74007ed…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.3 KB
MD5: 631d0d510c9cbbedecbb6780f0e44b26 SHA-1: 393998cac235c50c9f483bdff105676502c23bc1 SHA-256: 555d36fdc74007ed18b5dfa6f478adf4e5a1641946b4e6396d023254a1278cda
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics related to Equation Editor vulnerabilities. The presence of \objupdate indicates an attempt to force the activation of these embedded objects, likely leading to the execution of malicious code. This pattern is commonly associated with exploiting the Equation Editor vulnerability to achieve arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000009b.bin
34b3d26d20b3620521ce9f3cc30492174860c1325f824781149f731a5bc3392c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x9B 1994 bytes