Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 555467cb88d23529…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.92 MB
MD5: 0c0b60565c79f37d0e1d15b3b2013fc4 SHA-1: efcb55212302d0711069bdca97897b45f739358a SHA-256: 555467cb88d23529540d6d644cbd1862cf04a728d783b0f908457c073d5d5316
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of malicious activity, including the presence of OLE object data and specific heuristics pointing to the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability in Equation Editor. This exploit is known to be used for delivering arbitrary code execution, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1988KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000a5.bin
2f3ae05269d508d72f7d427bb07998233eb29838b72c947f4c77b4583acba82c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA5 997007 bytes