Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 55335b4e344932c5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

45.4 KB Created: 2020-11-08 16:16:50 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-26
MD5: bc890e9e93678363d374cde998daa0d7 SHA-1: 3bab2ae1d4fc84fe94e87d8b3b682e8d39cb4a07 SHA-256: 55335b4e344932c54e236d4e33ec434528aecbf13210407ea36af1ef908ca1f9
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable hosting services and redirect to a known malicious URL. This indicates a link farm designed to lure users to malicious infrastructure, likely for phishing or malware distribution. The document body itself contains obfuscated text and URLs, further supporting this malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/123?keyword=zeus+engineering+handbook+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://sagekafota.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134351395/rapezasuzudikab_maguxutagamodu_xerokobokek_sonetipux.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rowiteruna.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134470704/wugijiredatosoxam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xalesuben.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134368019/1780096.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vubisurajoguv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134265568/jikaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jabiratunibi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132683422/batureted_tajipibupit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ruxibero.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134403554/7ef07c3d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ruzunaxatan.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134340268/7445187.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/33fbbb2f-e159-49a8-b2a7-8ccb5fe6e1ee/49508261722.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kiwajawema.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/pleasantville_analysis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/501571fb-36cd-4b4c-89b0-c79159c4f09b/lovugujanumiwejumesivasuv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/pazifetanegapu/cultivo_de_arveja_en_bolivia.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jopafez.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/15872170774.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1e7d1eda-5d61-427f-99ba-8e5bcfc0bf82/54928881513.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d09d542b-fb49-409c-96cc-74833e066958/61617608759.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/46129f47-3265-46f7-81c1-8face07e7fdb/70255850184.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/simujix/93284141131.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/44a672c0-cef5-4d3e-9054-710e8c732241/megirozonufa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006364.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6364 5236 bytes
SHA-256: 1ebe6c8e5f57039eebc8f64b9ce9bdc21c497fb19a2c8a457885622910e52248
font_01_sfnt_off00007515.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7515 10912 bytes
SHA-256: 048af9ff6f267a066b8702ee584476c8ebc572f2e1c1b99fb12817537b114077
font_02_sfnt_off00009a62.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9A62 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 1158d95dac44631f497756703988ba3645251422e7ff0015d3fca430225e7c3e

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