Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 54f88a13720f577d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

49.3 KB Created: 2021-06-14 11:39:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 90f830f394798beeab08062829ad1103 SHA-1: 14ae965eadf99d78177ca24544de9f7b1d35a744 SHA-256: 54f88a13720f577d84c6e97491f588e7c79b4b6e9df490faef663de2c19cc12c
162 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The sample is an OOXML document containing a VBA macro. The presence of an AutoOpen macro and a Shell() call strongly suggests that the macro is designed to execute arbitrary commands upon opening. This is a common technique for downloading and executing further malicious stages. No specific IOCs were extracted beyond the VBA code itself.

Heuristics 5

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — context-specific rules above attribute URLs they actually evaluated; this rule lists URLs that were present in the bytes but were not otherwise tied to a specific finding.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
85f288c0397518e75593b118a60d82912fb1ab50d80c88aaf61eefa0acd26fd7
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1277 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
fb0ee85075ef22a872d35506a7fedd91e8594e82bbf09b234e9368ebeb35a066
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 16896 bytes