Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 54f75ad8604c45b4…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.48 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 73cf6c85b0eb4086ddbdcded4170d5ef SHA-1: b0a66c16032cd69dbe48f18a82165e00ed388bf0 SHA-256: 54f75ad8604c45b4e8798d60074ae7595ec8599fee61ed01cb0e34db23e41bde
68 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The critical heuristic firing indicates exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object, which attempts to load a remote resource. The embedded URL, HtTp://00015353165724/www.cdwg.comcontentcdwgenarticlessecurityprotecting-ot-and-critical-infrastructure-in-an-evolving-threat-linkingclooud.php, is highly suspicious and likely serves as the initial download location for a secondary payload. Although VBA macros were present, they contained no executable statements, suggesting the exploit is delivered through the OLE object itself rather than macro execution.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://www.extensis.com/meta/FontSense/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
stream_002_off0003143e.bin
f2951dec6c447226a46f2ef66a88bc53bfb49ea238f8aa11495e3f4412148c78
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x3143E 589956 bytes
stream_004_off00069a10.bin
bed483098579cb54e4c46d7bc96a8f67fffdabfe857d073fce5794e26d65f738
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x69A10 568384 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0001b10c.bin
29b7877085b9d58ec1e86435cb951197bb010b6a5da0cc21fa45b808e6f3bf66
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1B10C 345200 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0009c76a.bin
a1605696cbb7129724ec887654f8e3b881348b214a6fb0c2d399f9e039e8702c
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9C76A 345900 bytes