Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 54d2501f04cf0f17…

MALICIOUS

PDF

35.0 KB Created: 2009-08-30 00:20:17 UTC Authoring application: AdobePS5.dll Version 5.2.2 (via Mac OS X 10.5.8 Quartz PDFContext) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 68634b586eac96051a16e198b2cfe9b5 SHA-1: f471f045c15115773f5dbf0c53fc42e599ac036f SHA-256: 54d2501f04cf0f171bc0fba3ac00f3e0caf68376da4e92c71c80cc806c2965cb
576 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The PDF file contains a JavaScript action that triggers a launch action, which in turn executes cmd.exe. This cmd.exe command is designed to execute an embedded Windows executable payload disguised as 'form.pdf'. The embedded artifact was detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.ShellcodeReverseTcp-1, indicating a malicious payload. The PDF structure and embedded executable strongly suggest a delivery mechanism for malware.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\form.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL tcp://192.168.42.137:18080 In extracted file (form.pdf)
    • http://www.iec.chIn extracted file (icc_00_off000002d6.icc)

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
form.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 21 at offset 0x3B9E 37888 bytes
SHA-256: f37feefd074175ccad1f7f9e056e576fdfac50268c3fca0fe9cfe0dfe5fcb631
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.ShellcodeReverseTcp-1
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=form.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 192.168.42.137:18080 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): cmd
javascript_obj0022_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 22 at offset 0x8812 53 bytes
SHA-256: eff4a0943aaff2d99cb5c8666337775c91d4d5f687782df94d2c5fc77becde7f
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "form", nLaunch: 0 });
icc_00_off000002d6.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x2D6 3144 bytes
SHA-256: 2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e
font_00_sfnt_off00000e23.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE23 13900 bytes
SHA-256: ac6efb60566e49cb2cc918348e471fe3f01c12322c4aa7ec58d84bf608cab323

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