Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 54c7510012eae284…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

202.7 KB Created: 2021-10-25 11:03:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: 6e355ce5edba4001949649253a8caab4 SHA-1: afade5ee266ab7423367146106e0013ec46f99e6 SHA-256: 54c7510012eae28448d4297f32038cfa07de972b4a65a712a1c819f0bed57bd7
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1137.006 Office Application Build to Execution: OLE

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing an embedded OLE object. This object is identified as a risky file package that drops an auto-executable payload, specifically a JAR file. The presence of the embedded OLE object and the nature of the dropped payload strongly suggest an attack pattern involving malicious attachments designed to execute secondary payloads.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
9cec08e7fd172552327520d7f3775dce3aeb4c5b558fa55546acd7512036a7c1		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 192512 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.96, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
fa91846e3ad7b78a1a292f267264ae5f848e8a11f4d843c395e401f4a49285be		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 188172 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.99, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
24d49e09360f5368b8b73d0df12339486c1be574a7204e90018c91cba55f1698		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5140 bytes

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