Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 54c13bd942ffbd80…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

2.41 MB
MD5: 3753bf58e6e991a4fe8875fd4e696120 SHA-1: 60810c3a7b93c5c163babc0d478cddaceeaf0c7d SHA-256: 54c13bd942ffbd80f85f63155235d56a96624af3761c74932a4493ee3f3ff693
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an encrypted OOXML file that contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object. This object exhibits anomalies suggesting it carries a payload, a common technique for delivering exploits. The default encryption password and the presence of the Equation Editor OLE object are strong indicators of malicious intent, likely for exploitation.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Equation Editor object carries payload-like Ole10Native stream high OLE_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE_PAYLOAD_ANOMALY
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object declares the Equation Editor CLSID but stores a large high-entropy Ole10Native stream with malformed package sizing. This is exploit-shaped Equation/OLE payload evidence.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.