Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 54ba415f427da70d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

104.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-03-24
MD5: e451461492849e6dd93e1280d86294f7 SHA-1: 06d270d06e01a4ad4688e78fd0a807fb274e76cb SHA-256: 54ba415f427da70d122382ef32b4dbed321c8b6288a134fff1bb2f6e0ac7588a
70 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing indicates exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object, which attempts to load a remote resource from the provided URL. The embedded URL is likely the initial stage of a multi-stage attack, designed to download and execute a secondary payload. No VBA macros were found to contain executable statements, suggesting the exploit relies solely on the OLE object vulnerability.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://kkkkkkkkkkkkk34kkkkkkkkkkkkkk34kkkkkkkkkkkkkk34kkkkkkkkkkkkkk34kkkkkkkkkkkk34kkkkkkkkkkkkkk34ksdfhdskfhsdkfh33hkh34h3k@192.3.111.161/43.........................43....................doc

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes