PDF malware analysis — malicious · 54b48e943400a9a8

MALICIOUS

PDF

11.9 KB

MD5: 80aed2e656b996fae08be62bcba73c29 SHA-1: 082bb1a5e29ee8763fb5eba0d8c35bb98ee0bc02 SHA-256: 54b48e943400a9a839a1c2e1247e06b1bf20b52458c66734991099046621db76

186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.001 JavaScript/JScript T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, specifically identified as a stager using the CVE-2007-5659 vulnerability (Collab.collectEmailInfo). This JavaScript is heavily obfuscated but ultimately aims to execute further malicious code. The ClamAV detection of 'Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063' further confirms its malicious nature. The primary attack vector appears to be exploiting a PDF reader vulnerability to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 7

Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659

PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063
Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER

PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN

PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`javascript_obj0007_000.js` `eb39e2de4dbbc100de6d3e30aa43ff78fa075618862ba1ebba5151ea3a3b848d`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 7 at offset 0x19D	273 bytes
`annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js` `76423806024983a243afd22a42006667da4ab070e8485e343adaa13f33d28f4e`	deobfuscated-js	annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x14A	5126 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
`deobfuscated.js` `ef756588f92a0dd269583c12823e6ab1d78502f1221c3ea26d8d150da90adb0d`	deobfuscated-js	PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass	70064 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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