Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 54a8b8c933633c08…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

43.3 KB Created: 2018-11-25 23:57:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000 First seen: 2023-03-29
MD5: 0f77143ce98d0b9f69c802789e3b1713 SHA-1: 7da4e8b743478370fa41fe39a45e3ff2ca2194b3 SHA-256: 54a8b8c933633c089f03d07cfbd5cafbf76a6d7095f2706d6604e739bb9c950f
282 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a VBA macro with a Document_Open subroutine that utilizes the Shell() function. This macro concatenates several text box values to construct a command, which is then executed. The reconstructed command appears to be a registry run key: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\IAccessible2Proxy. This indicates the malware's intent to establish persistence and likely download or execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6936064-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6936064-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
6b95d1264beba0b75b2691a213408fe6fe0288d5147e7c6ae7fb5154c8ba386d		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1388 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
4dcd5f6383709fca89ae6bf7bed14373ea482a9221e41db6dc2b5511599f84af		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 20992 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6936064-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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