Malware Insights
The sample contains VBA macros that execute upon opening, leveraging WScript.Shell to create two files: a VBScript and a batch file. The VBScript is designed to execute a second-stage payload using the WScript.Shell 'Run' command. The batch file attempts to clean up temporary files and then uses msedge to navigate to a data URI which redirects to 'https://webhook.site/cf25f91c-0a20-4339-834f-02f73e8bc75e', indicating a download or command-and-control communication attempt. The presence of an AutoOpen macro, obfuscated shell commands, and the creation of executable files strongly suggest a downloader or initial access payload.
Heuristics 11
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Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELLShell() call in VBA
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WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPTWScript.Shell usage
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Obfuscated VBA Shell command with URL critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_SHELL_URLVBA macro invokes Shell with command text assembled through decoder or string-manipulation functions and includes a URL. This is a high-confidence downloader/dropper pattern, stronger than Shell or URL evidence on their own.
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AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPENAutoOpen macro
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CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJCreateObject call
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VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECCompiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
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Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBADocument contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
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Remote image (web beacon / tracking pixel) medium OOXML_IMAGE_BEACONDocument references an external image URL — loads automatically on open, revealing IP address and timestamp to the server (used for phishing tracking and NTLM hash theft on corporate networks)
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External relationship medium OOXML_EXTERNAL_RELExternal target in word/_rels/document.xml.rels: http://webhook.site/62114596-33f5-47fb-9012-0223529e5a13/docopened.jpg
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://webhook.site/62114596-33f5-47fb-9012-0223529e5a13/docopened.jpg
- https://webhook.site/5744c020-a8d9-4755-abfb-cde6ccd450af
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahash
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task^
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas6325fc78393d1cb72465b5e288c7148624bd88f17c2047278db2022df5f1e6b2 |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) | 6802 bytes |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 7 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
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vbaProject_00.bin75ddca8bbf861645bc641d3bc46390d3a0cc4723ef933279d29b17150983ddf6 |
vba-project | OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin | 39936 bytes |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 7 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
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