Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5485bb8732541946…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

15.9 KB First seen: 2023-03-13
MD5: d5fb661ecc506d0ce0293376476b8b82 SHA-1: d4e6b41c0a678e0c6b7ffcb64d65e95d14aebd2d SHA-256: 5485bb8732541946bef3ac1b1774e46e6df5f994db7e90c3d06546d1c2cf66bf
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The sample is an RTF document that leverages OLE object embedding, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The document body contains text designed to trick the user into enabling editing and macros, which is a common lure for malware droppers. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJAUTLINK, RTF_OBJUPDATE, and SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristics strongly indicates an attempt to exploit OLE object activation to execute a malicious payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001e34.bin
8f0498f222028f31dba53c64229443af404bcd6a151b8a65d718ccf9db060a97
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1E34 1879 bytes