Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5477df2edca77d54…

MALICIOUS

PDF

33.5 KB Created: 2020-10-03 03:01:24 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-15
MD5: 03e3775948b4a6044f90a261d4876a43 SHA-1: e45a4febe1df3809f453ba867b6eebd2d7829410 SHA-256: 5477df2edca77d5484c5e833f8c9209664c46490eaf110e41205a4002ba3c834
224 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/strik?keyword=nomenclatura+oxidos+metalicos+ejercicios+resueltos In PDF document text
    • https://site-1039636.mozfiles.com/files/1039636/naruza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038548.mozfiles.com/files/1038548/800966499.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038788.mozfiles.com/files/1038788/5762201602.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038412.mozfiles.com/files/1038412/98721520311.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037059.mozfiles.com/files/1037059/89322628735.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.samuelmeilakphotography.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131378952/2169366.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.littlebitofheavenadoptionreferral.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776208/piganewuko-xosopituvasij-kuxixusox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.nottinghammanandvan.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383629/6764919.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.bluetrilliumdesigns.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738928/7730581.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.ivychurchbristol.org.uk/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681976/rinulosuzigipoxi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/0bf07aa1-8738-4f5f-b751-e8068b19c04a/55861995081.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4faabaf0-60c4-4311-a7e0-2e83ee015bbc/famuvasa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/416b2a42-1750-4643-b558-69a0fcee9ca0/velebatojawozanuwegum.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/77f2783c-80c0-405d-9dde-b001130d3fd1/36238541339.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0484/9241/3090/files/kujenasirinozoraxikuluni.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0481/3530/7417/files/pofexexoxeliwawisora.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000449e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x449E 5196 bytes
SHA-256: f8119b5bb3cbd08578c216708c05a8df1ada0dbc36553472381bece1a7a1f706
font_01_sfnt_off0000563b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x563B 10076 bytes
SHA-256: 9c532b18b703bd31f0ec19d7e05459ab1d23c98712b5bfa5a551dbc16b3a5b40

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