Malicious Office (OLE) / .PPT — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 54670ce1c29d6769…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .PPT

240.0 KB Created: 2006-08-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office PowerPoint
MD5: 3e62fc9944a9a780fe77e4f3cdbc5b7c SHA-1: e70654becfa238e70c8cb85bdea93d2c1dec97a1 SHA-256: 54670ce1c29d6769066d555d5ccb57bf1163b5573e393dcd968cd22ac7b114f1
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is a PowerPoint presentation containing VBA macros. The Auto_Close macro is configured to execute a command using the Shell() function. This indicates the macro is designed to run arbitrary commands upon closing the presentation. No specific malware family could be identified, but the technique is common for initial execution of malicious payloads.

Heuristics 5

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://1230948%1230948@j.mp/jaslpjidkokplsaplaslpasplaslspajj

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
2821e33f8eed61bc9da36c97667a2fc3f9901ce14eee9d12bd4fa400f1be9d33
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 21339 bytes