RTF malware analysis — malicious · 53f52ed185f98283

MALICIOUS

RTF

87.1 KB First seen: 2024-07-24

MD5: 0244568fb48a51a72c3581e220328e90 SHA-1: 85b585ca0a609a80bb0ccb56d62673c0762da74d SHA-256: 53f52ed185f98283e220bcd59a64d7f3eb93b544fa04f16768f3a2707f43ac11

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the OLE object will be activated automatically upon opening the document. This exploit is known to be used for arbitrary code execution, typically to download and run a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001472.bin` `3bad8a2b5390514346810504f991d0ab9589c3e0264d8123c43df918379616cd`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1472	1851 bytes

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