Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 53d442ca2fe6ff4a…

MALICIOUS

RTF

42.1 KB First seen: 2023-07-11
MD5: 45bc6b0241b35b2b24e44e624280b598 SHA-1: f6451a42adb057d5cde918d7961735043cf714de SHA-256: 53d442ca2fe6ff4a27698e29dc00faded46a5a36d724022f04a5ba230a4bc4a9
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking: OLE

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability (RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR). The ".objupdate" directive indicates that the OLE object will be activated automatically upon opening, bypassing user interaction. The document also contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', a common tactic to trick users into allowing malicious content to run. The embedded OLE object is the primary indicator of compromise, likely serving as a dropper for a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004845.bin
799a9e69896f9fcd9a58ea175b69a932936a2e54f8e6bb204ef2ae9ba4b23a2a
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4845 1954 bytes