Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 53d0a9fd329c4fee…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

14.0 KB Created: 1998-04-11 13:24:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 6.0 First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 0f3a34c12912ea33780a59fe141467e6 SHA-1: 3a7e1f32eb2037a2d3f97bfd9c01dc6ed533d58b SHA-256: 53d0a9fd329c4feedf573fb20b4b8fa3dc0fe8d3bb3c0904f9a9974024a5a705
120 Risk Score

Heuristics 3

  • Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
  • Legacy WordBasic macro-virus markers high OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_MACRO_VIRUS
    OLE Word document contains legacy WordBasic auto-execution macro markers such as AutoOpen plus ToolsMacro/MacroFile/fileMacro/globMacro or named historical macro-virus strings. These old Word 6/95 macro forms are not exposed as a modern VBA project, so normal VBA source extraction can miss them.
  • CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMS
    This finding applies to a carved embedded Office document found at a nonzero offset inside the submitted file, not directly to the top-level document. The file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_off00001640.ole embedded-office Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x1640 8640 bytes
SHA-256: a9b9ffcac5190087446fe744e797495b8068af54ee83ff0835d4761fbd0239e5