RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 53b891cd07ba659c

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.22 MB

MD5: f117b4935cd1eefe6b12dae144142c0e SHA-1: 78e17c25e70007166e905a8b449c25d2ee2aac02 SHA-256: 53b891cd07ba659cbb5c1ced0b3099ce57990b4f90f8d27a36371df0b64060b1

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including one specifically identified as an Equation Editor exploit. The ".objupdate" heuristic indicates that the embedded OLE object is designed to be activated automatically upon opening the document. This strongly suggests an exploit targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) to achieve arbitrary code execution. The extracted artifact 'objdata_01_off0000c02f.bin' is likely the malicious payload or a loader for it. The document body contains VBA-like code snippets that appear to be related to fetching or manipulating data, further supporting the execution of a secondary stage.

Heuristics 5

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000aa1.bin` `e8a5d6a4a99405e4d209f591db70882626e674a144218bc07bb0023dd4f0038b`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xAA1	22092 bytes
`objdata_01_off0000c02f.bin` `6916d1837df3ba0b045f804f40d0d20d9769560281eb0fb77b36c5be2c546294`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xC02F	126 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s).
`objdata_02_off0000ce77.bin` `3d9be70b79d68fd5df782793d0fb9193d361e074fa235c7db20d8e326bc7f158`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xCE77	555306 bytes

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