Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 53921a928043ee39…

MALICIOUS

PDF

35.2 KB Created: 2020-11-02 22:55:53 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: 5453c2fa3221b88e74bc6e89f8a656bd SHA-1: e76761c30048fb88b9fcb751c3ff267668f0686f SHA-256: 53921a928043ee393ae8345b5f7dc4f4cf6f3ff37b6b9d3e9109fbd2ee30e871
184 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains a significant number of embedded URLs, with heuristics indicating it functions as a link farm and redirects to malicious infrastructure. The presence of a known malicious redirector URL and numerous links on disposable hosting strongly suggests a phishing or spam campaign designed to lead users to malicious sites. No scripts were extracted, but the structure and URL findings are highly indicative of malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/123?keyword=dance+space+richmond In PDF document text
    • https://xonujofepip.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134385468/2232214.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kesafoxubifode.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134481064/9af1d7031faefb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lebiranewedeto.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134595514/kitoz_zopufizexa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://goduvozimaku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380582/1313875.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wekubuzebebam.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739705/4436334.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://genigudepa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070712/ff06dfdf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://terowibew.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134370771/keminamosix-nekovin-tijojevoribi-wesuberajo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e27a131e-59d6-4581-9e4f-7805fced51e8/bigavisajimijajikix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c8c9bbf7-7df6-4e84-8f3c-8f1e899ab5dc/30805274861.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d17ac480-f625-4cc8-96ab-2cc4c30b3336/vudopabokiti.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gizonukorad/moog_tie_rod_ends_by_size.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0503/8050/5240/files/mcgraw_hill_connect_microbiology_test_answers.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0505/1167/5578/files/48624493740.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/74a91413-8cfd-4f13-9585-cf9d5be9a486/gubotuluzamovap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/matogapibelifiv/50072330476.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00004a9d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4A9D 5280 bytes
SHA-256: 3a73eedb26d8a93f26bae579056cad9b5de207deef442622540366b47c1a81fb
font_01_sfnt_off00005c66.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5C66 10472 bytes
SHA-256: 6870e93e6b369d1cb46ae0caf521e322131c53983a9db97e44212a4e4809a6cb

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