Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 53654bcdcb91c14a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

21.9 KB Created: 2025-06-14 16:25:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: f0246943f8fd24a7e5df9aa1776849d0 SHA-1: 8e35d7ecefcc720e395f4b25e31a98759785fe8c SHA-256: 53654bcdcb91c14a1cd0fbc61c5aa7444c7fa01ba980f5e9b49225f399194bf7
300 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1071.001 Web Protocols T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The OOXML document contains a Document_Open macro that executes a Base64-decoded shell command stager. This stager uses schtasks.exe to create a scheduled task that downloads and executes a second-stage payload from the URL https://glamormusicswave.gr8z.php. The use of CreateObject and Shell() calls within the VBA macro indicates a downloader pattern.

Heuristics 8

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • VBA Base64-decoded Shell command stager critical OLE_VBA_BASE64_SHELL_COMMAND_STAGER
    VBA auto-exec macro decodes Base64 string literals into command or script-launch text and executes the result with Shell. This catches cmd/cscript/PowerShell/VBS launchers hidden from plain keyword matching.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
b1e49f5fd2ff8cee524ed48363dde7e633ab6261d67a49e1da3c8bc337eca1d7		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2176 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
1be34673ffa16e52146892b254fc122f73ed02547d81df936882115fcdbd489f		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 21504 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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