Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 536166859cb8277e…

MALICIOUS

RTF

3.1 KB First seen: 2022-10-07
MD5: 5a6f53d59b7871783d802e54557b67d7 SHA-1: 28852ab880c5162224255c72afcf7caf0014b6c7 SHA-256: 536166859cb8277e2d1e1cd7269d26b564919243e8af32e9490fd4a9982a7ce8
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, leading to arbitrary code execution. No document body text was available for further analysis, but the heuristics strongly suggest a classic Equation Editor exploit.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000077.bin
bbac0b82a0eb741002ef83e6164743b8d986b7b35372effb18c7015a77e6d2fd
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x77 1499 bytes