Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 53552c199d5a14b5…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.3 KB
MD5: 8c74891aa24f0efdd2d6132a3d8181cd SHA-1: f26cf91eab993261988b71c36e22ab9d926f8b32 SHA-256: 53552c199d5a14b5efbf737f58d6ea1458837c09dd3401adc5f5a81e39d2c5b7
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded object will be activated automatically upon opening the document, leading to exploitation. This is a common delivery mechanism for exploiting the Equation Editor vulnerability to achieve arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000a6.bin
1dec3b808c3103b8c74ed84be7e3dc5aaf774c12309069f972f660077a06a062
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA6 1390 bytes