Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 534db2054ace6f66…

MALICIOUS

RTF

44.7 KB First seen: 2024-06-14
MD5: af079d569c6115b1f3998c7cce495168 SHA-1: 6b7a4a562b26cf5429cd43264659ef98756cdda8 SHA-256: 534db2054ace6f669e3c8084cba85ed1e3a589c299cee4527c8e9a84939e4bbc
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically, likely leading to the execution of a secondary payload. No document body or script content was available for further analysis, but the heuristics strongly suggest exploitation.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002060.bin
44ec5463ab1fd7514b5f944eca821e3308e712cac4201365dc840112a5dd27aa
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2060 2111 bytes