Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5338fa2152dad75b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.9 KB Created: 2020-11-04 04:01:46 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: 8810e4a17f17ca94ad8b450f572e412a SHA-1: 969c925eaf5d42d4d888343ea2f48e2977bb2e80 SHA-256: 5338fa2152dad75b2f7ddb1f8d833b2d254374a1e68651b6493a6bf7cf67c544
184 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a link farm designed to redirect users to various external PDF documents, with one URL pointing to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, and the structure suggests an attempt to obscure the final malicious destination through multiple layers of redirection and link farms. No scripts were extracted, but the PDF structure itself facilitates the attack.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/123?keyword=pathfinder+gory+finish In PDF document text
    • https://xalipifizipig.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379045/kizenexexok-somojur-kigebewujamofeb-fozibomufoxo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xaniwunedevivat.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134470123/9cca93.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sexozorojupur.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134390270/31a990.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366388/normal_5f8ec27e3c4ab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://junafoxotoroj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738975/niwudexutisoboruro.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/30838c0c-ca62-4c22-8a4e-32b37ea1f22d/vamep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/5696/2467/files/gedadigetefofinatukog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/acc4e1c8-8ce2-4ae5-a10a-e86d51835790/kozipegeke.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gupuso/10715396349.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/897bf1b3-b27e-4fe2-8ba1-ae380591b40d/como_hacer_un_diagrama_unifilar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d757a449-fddf-4f41-b105-77aed1bc7a31/noloxaliwujevapagixiba.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/bulolimepol/jopesotidibof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b43b7e03-38c5-4836-9c69-62f35bc0a24b/freebox_bloqu_tape_6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005c83.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5C83 5240 bytes
SHA-256: c0b4a9bf91ab7ecc21f829c3252d4c7afd0dc4fb05cbe361ad7257602aae79fe
font_01_sfnt_off00006e5b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6E5B 10684 bytes
SHA-256: c28ad953dd2eece96f625efad114185c8bad5097e6c2aa084567e65b3599d3b0

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