Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5319bcca360ed083…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.04 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-02-11
MD5: 83fb9b4b8bf57924205be8c237f8e591 SHA-1: 2630fce743e760f869e704406aa5fd3587c27660 SHA-256: 5319bcca360ed083ad894ecd99d85dbc0a889e68a418695e9968d2d0951d9cce
150 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an Excel file containing an embedded Equation Editor object, which is known to be vulnerable to CVE-2017-11882. This vulnerability allows for the execution of arbitrary code when the object is opened. No VBA macros were found to be executable, but the presence of the vulnerable OLE object strongly indicates an exploit attempt.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP ESI) high SC_GETPC_CALL
    x86 GetPC stub (CALL $+5; POP ESI)
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
94fb321ef689253c518372f738c6f51a1a3a6f2abb4008f3357bbf4f0453dcc8		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0239B964/oLE10natiVE 1565 bytes

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