RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 5312bfa03659e5df

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

335.6 KB

MD5: c5354ecae9bf0c75290cfe64efac18dd SHA-1: c1b9a333eb0bf6dadd97f47603b41605ae8e7425 SHA-256: 5312bfa03659e5dfadf6a913be2e57045d1016cb1af8c5ea409255a821b5494e

182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This exploit is known to deliver a second-stage payload. The heuristic firings strongly indicate the use of this specific vulnerability. No document body text was available for analysis, but the exploit and embedded artifact are sufficient to determine the attack pattern.

Heuristics 5

Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED

RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001353.bin` `8e68286ee645b782786201da5150994db00a7a2878ad82ee268701223670c7f8`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1353	61561 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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