Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5309bf88b3050af5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

88.2 KB Created: 2021-06-19 02:50:05 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-22
MD5: 2a2c7d4cd0b2f6c0e8019369d124ecf6 SHA-1: 17f928c944eb0f2b2582b32966cf52915d19c1bd SHA-256: 5309bf88b3050af578934bf4122be1bb70da691764282c97b8a1d0ffd30e82d5
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, exhibiting characteristics of a phishing lure. It contains multiple links to compromised WordPress upload directories and impersonates the brand 'Apple' with a call-to-action button, suggesting an attempt to trick users into downloading a payload or revealing credentials. The embedded URLs and link farm structure indicate a likely distribution mechanism for malware or phishing campaigns.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Payment redirection / bank-detail change lure high SE_PAYMENT_REDIRECT_LURE
    Document describes new or changed bank, wire, ACH, IBAN, SWIFT, or routing instructions — a high-value business-email-compromise pattern
  • Brand-impersonation credential phishing lure high SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH
    Document impersonates a well-known consumer brand and uses account-security / verification language ('unusual activity', 'account on hold', 'verify your account') to steer the reader to a credential-harvesting link. Corroborated by: call-to-action link host does not match the impersonated brand: https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/1xuhb7AK25c/uplcv?utm_term=public+finance+final+exam+questions+and+answers.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://conservationenergy.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16075827cafde4---63099852871.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://www.hj-bouwt.be/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160734ac5d7bbb---39251804443.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://herculesestateplanning.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/52450239608.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.a-fairys-choice.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16096500fd4210---4471392995.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://2girlstrippin.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16070022fa3871---beripoxigopolowetutowomuv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://melissajacksonmd.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c2ee4e17885---37489869995.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://homeopathyhongkong.cn/files/42459197523.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://yziact.fr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ncim823pcmrdubk0efrj30t28d/wipifasot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://staffxrecruitment.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/da9f0296e32aa42876d4e3b41763a475/86997927323.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.hinogas.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8c7tbsoorv8vmh5b0f24g7sgkb/71378343825.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://carpanea.it/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8e765277449c43be3a2f76aff4074e82/47239091169.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://segurosjdd.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/thham4qp0cravul3t5q8j724q7/56071305197.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://parokisantolukas.org/Uploads/userfiles/files/zasilenobulojelopedigenin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ivanda-commerce.hr/userfiles/file/kixosuzupabebanamapenij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.c2commercial.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d9bb9c5b90202fb4e09e3a3ef0cfb004/bedimazegowefetokixize.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://metzpaintings.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160cbd4ffc95be---56742808257.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.landalastadservice.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606d825c2a04c---tuzedufanefibowuza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://almoheetmanpower.com/public_html/userfiles/file/ranipid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/1xuhb7AK25c/uplcv?utm_term=public+finance+final+exam+questions+and+answersPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00011555.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11555 5596 bytes
SHA-256: 7f53b6ce1b30934ba82075a67e99db9e23c62dcd930460765287cdb8d5899f69
font_01_sfnt_off00012855.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12855 13196 bytes
SHA-256: 19a6d98e1532e578089c386eee1117402521e3a9fc83f7690725f4c8461d863c

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