Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 52fe6d31f2c772ee…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCM

18.6 KB Created: 2022-03-21 17:10:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 15.0000 First seen: 2022-04-18
MD5: 237564dd1eb00ad345f2645e3eba009a SHA-1: c13950b5baa63a252447de99efeb887ca670b62a SHA-256: 52fe6d31f2c772eee5f13323f74bbc705849923b205b83c0ab73b55330c0d796
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML document contains a VBA macro that executes upon opening, as indicated by the AutoOpen subroutine. The script attempts to download a second-stage payload by executing 'conhost.exe calc.exe' via the Shell() function. This is a common technique for delivering further malicious content. The document's body text explicitly prompts the user to enable macros to view the content, acting as a lure.

Heuristics 6

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
02afaca6c50101d627b9130a8e66786ea3c0d5da7beef93ae899889608ae62a1		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 693 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
fe655c8fc418ce941fd3b1ecb34eff63fafdc1fe4a9ec63de83c71e17841f15e		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 17408 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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