RTF malware analysis — malicious · 52e96531793f7ce2

MALICIOUS

RTF

78.3 KB First seen: 2024-07-09

MD5: 475ca8bafdf4415277b388b64edc3313 SHA-1: 1221f3de623d6e48df1b61c44451e4205dd26476 SHA-256: 52e96531793f7ce2b0f331758fe16005be2b353131dd45638aa61e26fa900e5c

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically. This strongly suggests an exploit chain where the Equation Editor vulnerability is leveraged to achieve code execution, likely to download and run a subsequent stage.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000191c.bin` `bcfc6804c1a9f5508ded9633b57da52cdbc5b2d7d3486f05925b0810046ee108`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x191C	1585 bytes

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