Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 52d25140ba397b87…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.2 KB Created: 2020-07-09 16:14:21 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-08-10
MD5: 173162619847162408ad8c103c529a74 SHA-1: ecfb3449dd7218a9aace931cc3c1854958f2fdda SHA-256: 52d25140ba397b8734d3bb1d42d0958f1ca001d77b2163b107ecfb5dc45a1898
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF contains numerous embedded links, with one identified as a known malicious redirector. The document body, though partially garbled, includes text related to a bus schedule and the wkhtmltopdf tool, suggesting a lure. The presence of a link farm heuristic further indicates an attempt to manipulate search engine results or distribute malicious content. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wb?keyword=186%20bus%20schedule%20nj%20pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.niaimani.net/uploads/1/3/2/7/132741194/f4f62.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.keepanopenmind.net/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814642/354913.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.nicholastoddshumate.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164418/7969586.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.dianehaymesphotography.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131858287/94fcd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.middlelanefarm.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383467/6d4d8d105.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.trailblazersunit.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636995/tekatejafavo_fuvodetomevi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.seatoskycheer.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738951/finejak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.romehospitalfoundation.org/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695994/4493471.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.raquelmeraki.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740860/3354846.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://puxekagoduse.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/bonodarimatorepefejexod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ximuzasonuzi.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/74915810560.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wekusov.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/56383656968.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zagezaf.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/51759627838.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wemekuwi606608615.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/50801687671.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dazapume.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/vemefivatekoxojodugok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/38664456414.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/52325197595.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/31443612403.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006889.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6889 5100 bytes
SHA-256: cdc83c999b839a7f844354d6ee3462f13c58ceb561eecebd41ca5e62b7220b35
font_01_sfnt_off000079d7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x79D7 10096 bytes
SHA-256: aa939292405e7110c8dadfbea88d0825e8194030040b5fdeaa5f614587219f9d

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