Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 52c50baae54876a0…

MALICIOUS

RTF

8.2 KB First seen: 2021-02-19
MD5: 876528ab15df6ae27a8293f597b74683 SHA-1: 79fef4067ed93c36074903dd2ea2acac48162715 SHA-256: 52c50baae54876a0b229b900a544f37cc2e15e86cb7cd827f187b4831eb88bc2
220 Risk Score

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000035.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x35 4148 bytes
SHA-256: 618be6f9c267666798f47af20c5eeac6e2f24e598653a487f87bf7b92682b80c