Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5287078230313c9b…

MALICIOUS

RTF

50.0 KB
MD5: e79a3eff7afad1baf05d316eabe8bf90 SHA-1: 420291ec39d86c8442aac0d447a107cdcac9a4ef SHA-256: 5287078230313c9bc74e5f6230b3c017c085eb389ed674547eabfb32d90ee018
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of exploitation targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability (RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR). The presence of OLE object data and the \objupdate directive further suggest that the file is designed to trigger code execution. This is a common method for delivering secondary payloads, hence the high confidence in exploitation for client execution.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000018e2.bin
d2b3f7c74ac62586a8dd725ca3016af48689b8266353e34ef19cb60ed2877e75
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x18E2 1624 bytes