Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 523b0765c65a0ea0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.2 KB Created: 2021-06-06 04:27:13 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: dfcf42e681aa4b7142b9f118cdb176fd SHA-1: 359295dba8133d58f29d99750cad45580e41e6e1 SHA-256: 523b0765c65a0ea0e6d6ff626965ccd5b57ea4688453ce0b96f711949901d86e
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or phishing operation. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, specifically related to phishing. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URIs are indicative of a malicious document designed to redirect users to potentially harmful sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9995

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://pistant.ru/pbw?utm_term=best+free+pdf+compressor+for+ios
    • https://mepopukivar.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/6/0/136083549/rasidajikovotofutogu.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366384/normal_60226d0f5ffd0.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static-d.com/uploads/4455176/normal_60b0027f6c383.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4454421/normal_606034d111876.pdf
    • https://kigolakelo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380934/5137765.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static-d.com/uploads/4462694/normal_60affb1d85942.pdf
    • https://xigodawi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134464905/a791858.pdf
    • https://zukifetev.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134725253/1a48dc204ffa00.pdf
    • https://tolopexe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070113/rirut_gowudupisi_kefefizupuvaj_jesev.pdf
    • https://dawikuwavuvuka.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134866752/wotaverumazi_vefipenu.pdf
    • https://nepexinis.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438592/2527874.pdf
    • https://pulivaxudifosaj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134235984/nujonaj.pdf
    • https://sogazefod.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134000298/funodisugotegeton.pdf
    • https://kevosenebiv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871602/3766943.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://noxiwako.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144515238/frozen_2_pelicula_completa_en_espaol_latino_disney_original_2019_youtube.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c4d319d8-2053-444a-a738-bab4d2c8cdad/power_electronics_and_drives_mcq.pdf
    • http://fotikeralo.pbworks.com/f/rikuzatozozejuwugino.pdf
    • http://fixunomavow.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144606435/bilugafulisamasi.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c4a69dda-e49c-4198-9958-5364a21bb8a9/jadexekunewitojisopewo.pdf
    • http://lugozamuxika.pbworks.com/f/what_type_of_stress_causes_rock_layers_to_fold.pdf
    • http://redejok.pbworks.com/f/schema_electrique_lampe_avec_interrupteur.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3a6b307b-5cb3-456b-bd5b-0c03c0d4ad0f/daxubojanomopamike.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00010f17.bin
5eafbcb9af280f1973fe48f1562cb7c55c3eb8e918051ea6650d062c18b138ba		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10F17 5108 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0001206a.bin
cf60daa4b01382ac63eeed5957f4e24677749964138b83b29e452e80bcb7d5ff		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1206A 11296 bytes

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